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IMTON Al. BERGERMAN
The practice of depriving stockholders of the right to
participate in the management of large corporations by means
of such devices as the voting trust and non-voting stock has
become so widespread that the legal status of these methods of
disenfranchising shareholders assumes a new importance.'
The object of this paper is to approach this legal question by
way of pointing out how both voting trusts and non-voting stock
involve the interesting problem of the social policy of allowing
or disallowing a minority in financial interest to control corporate
enterprise. 2
In the following discussion, Part I is an attempt to analyze the
decisions on voting trust agreements. Part II is a treatment of
non-voting stock and the social policy of minority control in
general. Before considering the subject matter of either Part I
or Part II, however, it has been deemed essential to develop the
historical background of the corporation in order to illuminate
the attitude of the modern law toward problems of corporate
control.
The first corporations were primarily political units to which
the crown directly granted sovereign power to exercise political
functions3 In the latter part of the fourteenth century the
craft guilds began to be organized and incorporated A group
'The legal status of the voting trust has been frequently discussed.
CUSHING, VOTING TRUSTS (2d ed. 1927); Baldwin, Voting Tr.sts (1891) 1
YALE LAW JOURNAL 1; Wormser, The Legality of Corporate Voting Trzita
and Pooling Agreements (1918) 18 COL. L. REv. 123; Smith, Limitations
On The Validity of Voting Tntss (1922) 22 COL. L. Rcv. 627; Finkelstein,
Voting Trust Agreements (1926) 24 MIcH. L. REv. 344. There is very
little material on the legal aspects of non-voting stock. See Berle, Non-
voting Stock and "Bankers' Control" (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 673.
2 This problem is also raised by the practice of pyramiding-the forma-
tion of a string of holding companies-prevalent in the public utility field.
Consideration of this aspect of the problem is omitted because adequate
treatment would require very extended comment on matters beyond the
scope of this paper. For an interesting discussion see Profezsor Ripley's
new book, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREE (1927) c. 5.
3 Williston, History of the Law of Bttsiness Corporations Before 1500
(1888) 2 HARV. L. REv. 105, 121; 1 DAvis, ConroA mNs-THEIR 0MGn;
AND DEvEL PMENT (1905) 174-6, 197.
4 The merchant guilds exsted prior to the craft guilds but they were
mere associations without a charter. As to reasons why the craft guilds




of men applied to the crown for a grant of power to regulate a
given trade. At about the same time the inhabitants of certain
towns, having some time before separated themselves from the
feudal system and formed autonomous groups, applied to the
crown for permission to set up local governments in more com-
plete and substantial form, as corporations. This was a terri-
torial political organization, the former was a functional political
organization. These were the first corporations.;
Both types of corporation exercised governmental functions.
They passed local statutes, binding on members and non-
members alike, and they had the power to enforce their laws
under the supervision of the king's courts.,
The modern business corporation developed from the guild
organization. Great commercial corporations were organized to
carry on trade abroad. They were given the power to regulate
that trade in foreign lands in much the same way as the guilds
had been given power to regulate trade at home.7 It was then
only a short step to the formation of the modern business corpo-
ration, without monopoly powers, and for the sole purpose, in
theory as in fact, of earning wealth for its members.8
,In the body of law that had been developing on this subject,
these business organizations were immediately classed with the
older corporations, although their essential difference in every-
thing but name and form is apparent. So we find no distinction
in the early law between any of the four very different kinds of
5 Perhaps ecclesiastical and eleemosynary corporations must also be in-
cluded as early types. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
(1926) 58; 1 DAvIs, op. cit. supra note 3, c. 3.
6 1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 154.
7 This began by the chartering of the so-called "regulated companies"
in the beginning of the 16th century (there were home even earlier) which
finally developed into the joint stock company. Even joint stock companies
retained some of their governmental powers until very recent times. For
an example of the grants of governmental powers to regulated companies
see the charter of the Merchants of Andalusia (1530) Patent Rolls, 22 Hon.
VIII, pt. 2; Carr, SELECT CHARTERS OF TRADING COM1PANIES (Selden, 1913)
1. For examples in the case of joint stock companies, see the charter of
the Russian Company (1555), the first important joint stock company, in 1
SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES (1912) 18. See also 8 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 199-212; 2 DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 110. As late as 1600.
the charter of the East India Company authorized the members to "make
such ... reasonable laws ... as shall seem necessary and convenient for the
good government of (the company) ... if only they be reasonable and not con-
trary to the laws, statutes and customs of England and in order to enforce
them they might impose such punishment and penalties by imprisonment of
body or by fines and amercements upon all offenders..."
8 Carr, op. cit. supra note 7, at xxi; 8 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 205.
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corporations-guild, town, church and businessY Legal princi-
ples which developed when political corporations were the pre-
vailing types were applied indiscriminately to the business
corporation.
The paramount consideration in the early political corporation
was to secure the general welfare of a relatively large group.
Even when the trading companies like the East India Company
were formed, they were given far reaching powers because they
were considered part of the government, established in the
general interest of English trade.20 It is natural that the
exercise of powers so directly connected with public welfare
should come under the close supervision of the courts. As may
well be expected, they took a live interest in the internal manage-
ment of such corporations.
On the other hand, the purpose and function of the business
corporation was not at all specially or directly connected with the
public welfare."' There is no reason for the close supervision
of the internal management of such enterprises,' - but the courts,
misled by conceptual similarity, insisted on regulating such
corporate affairs.
At first they did even more than this. Having formulated
definite standards for the internal government of public corpo-
rations on the basis of a widespread political theory, they applied
these same standards to private corporations vith the result
that plural voting and proxy voting were not allowed. 3 "One
man, one vote" was a result of a political philosophy which
assumed that every man had an equal interest in good govern-
ment and that the highest governmental wisdom, in the form of
the decision of the majority, would result from the clash of these
SWilliston, op. cit. supra note 3, at 123; 1 BL. CoiMD. c. 18. Blaclistone
distinguishes between corporations sole and aggregate. Ibid. *47G-7. He
also makes some distinctions between lay and ecclesiastical corporations,
especially regarding the Statute of Mortmain. 2 ibid. 02G$-9.
10 "It was from the point of view of trade organization and foreign policy
of the state rather than from the point of the interests of the perzons com-
posing the company-from the point of view of public rather than com-
mercial law-that the corporate form was valued." 8 Howswomru, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 202.
1 "Modern corporations seem to be substantially new bodies, modern not
only in time but also in the nature of their activity." 2 DALIs, OP. cit.
sztprao note 3, at 248.
- There may well be a new social interest in the internal management of
modern corporations as a result of their recent growth, resulting in unusual
economic power being wielded by those in control, on the one band, and in
the resulting number of the public concerned both in consuming their prod-
ucts and holding their securities on the other. But this factor raiss ncw
problems and certainly did not enter into the development outlined above.
Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. L. 222 (1834) and English caees therein
cited.
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interests. To allow a man more than one vote would throw the
whole mechanism for arriving at truth out of gear. Any device
which resulted in taking men's hearts and minds away from the
conflict was to be condemned. The Court said in Taylor v.
Griswold: 14
"The object of the legislature was to give permanency and
protection to the public improvement that had been erected and
security to the individuals who had embarked on the enterprise.
Instead of promoting and securing these legislative designs, the
tendency ... of the by-laws in question [allowing plural voting]
is to encourage speculation and monopoly, to lessen the rights
of small stockholders, depreciate the value of their shares and
to throw the whole property and government into the hand of
a few capitalists." (Italics the writer's).
When corporations began to be used primarily in the
production of wealth, and to be formed in large numbers for
that purpose, the law began to draw the distinctions it failed to
draw when this type was less numerous.25 The fact of private
interest in business corporations was thoroughly recognized and,
gradually, voting was made proportional to the amount of stock
held, thi tendency resulting finally in the adoption of statutes
allowing one vote for each share of stock held. Statutes were
passed allowing proxy voting, a further recognition of the non-
political character of modern corporations."
But the effect of the prior confusion persisted in several
aspects. The courts still insisted on regulating the internal
management of the corporation. The philosophy of government
which guided this regulation-the belief in majority rule-
remained the same. But there was this change in the application
of their philosophy: there was substituted for the general
interest which one has in the successful functioning of govern-
ment the interest which one has as an investor in the success of
a money-making project. In the former a majority in general
interest is supposed to emerge from the voting contest with a
wise governmental policy; in the latter a majority in financial
interest determines correct corporate policy as a result of a
similar conflict of honest judgments and opinions.17 Hence the
14 Supra note 13.
25" ... as to the points which belong exclusively to the conception of the
business corporation, the law has been formed very largely since 1800."
Williston, op. cit. supra note 3, at 113.
16 In some instances proxy voting was allowed in later corporations at
common law. See People v. Crossley, 69 Ill. 195 (1873).
17 "The fact that it is a business corporation in no wise dispenses with
the obligation of all members to assemble together, unless otherwise pro-
vided, for the ... election of their officers." See Commonwealth v. Bring-
hurst, 103 Pa. 134, 138 (1883). Here the court declared that a proxy vote
was invalid.
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mechanism of "majority rule" was taken over from politics
modified only in so far as a majority in financial interest was
substituted for a numerical majority.Y
Having accepted the theory that those who own a majority of
the assets will best govern the corporation, the courts can be
expected to react against devices which deprive investors in
corporate stock of voting power. Such devices put the manage-
ment of the corporation into the hands of people having little
or no financial interest in the enterprise. This so called "inside
management" thus exercises a power substantially dispropor-
tionate to its investment in the corporation. Control is taken
from owners of a majority of the capital stock and is exercised
by a financial minority. Thus voting trusts and non-voting
stock, involving minority rule in corporate enterprise, must
overcome the prejudices of courts steeped in the general doctrine
of rule by the majority.
The point of this analysis thus far is that the law tends to
look inimicably upon minority rule or the separation of control
from beneficial ownership because of a political analogy. This
is the result of similarity in form between business corporations
and political units. But this is at most only a tendency, and
there has been concurrently a desire to condemn this separation
on the merits of the case against it.
It is generally believed that a man will make the best possible
use of his own property, even from a social viewpoint. Remove
the risk of loss as a deterrent and a reckless and foolish policy
results. Thus Professor Ripley - concludes that the separation
of power from financial interest is a social evil:
"Fundamental these changes [post-war business changes] are,
inasmuch as they strike at the very tap-root of our capitalistic
system. For this system is founded on the theory that private,
as distinct from the common ownership of property, best con-
duces to the public welfare because such possession involves the
giving of a gage or guaranty by the owner to his fellow citizens
for thrifty, efficient, far-sighted and public spirited management
thereof. His is the reward if he be successful. And he bears the
loss in case of misdirection. Otherwise stated, it is the funda-
mental principle, interwoven throughout all human relationships,
that power and responsibility must ever be yoked together....
[These tendencies] put the public interest in sound and straight-
's It must be pointed out that the writer has made no attempt to pass
on the question of the origin of the concept of majority rule itself. A con-
sideration of this matter ig far beyond the scope of this paper. Even if
the theory is adopted that "majority rule" originated right in the old
political corporation, it in no way affects the problem at hand, which is that
of tracing the application of the doctrine, wherever it came from, to the
management of the business corporation.
Isa Ripley, More Pouxer to the Ban:ers (Dec. 2, 1925) 121 THE NlION
618.
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forward business in jeopardy-not because bankers as such are
more frail than other people in g6neral but simply because the
possession of uncontrolled power is almost certain to entail abuse
whereby both innocent and guilty are alike dragged down."
It seems that both the political theorist in his analogy, and
the economic theorist in his direct approach, have been misled
by the historical background of the subject in their fundamental
assumption that investors in modern corporations should control
the management of the enterprise at all. While it may have
been accurate to depict the stockholder as part owner and one
of the managers far back in corporation history and in some
corporations, to consider him such now is to make an entirely
false picture. The average stockholder in the modern corpora-
tion is an investor who is willing to take the earning power of
the company as his only security and is willing to forego steady
income for possibilities of greater gain.
The reluctance of stockholders in general to exercise their
voting privilege is a familar aspect of modern corporate manage-
ment. The fact is that they are not, and do not consider them-
selves part of the management. Non-voting stock and voting
trust certificates are sold without difficulty to the investing
public.
As a result of lack of interest of stockholders in management
and the wide sale of securities in small lots,19 the "compact
minority" rules corporate enterprise, as a practical matter. But
the courts, in considering the problem of minority control raised
by voting trusts and non-voting stock, are not considering this
kind of minority control. They are not directly concerned with
this larger problem of who shall really manage corporate enter-
prise in the last analysis. They are faced rather with the pros-
pect of permanent, crystallized minority control.
Control resulting from the inertia of stockholders is in no
way fixed. It may shift around and go into the hands of different
minorities at different times, and it leaves open the continuing
possibility of majority control. Minority control accomplished
by voting trusts and non-voting stock is relatively permanent
and crystallized. There is no possibility of change for a long
period of time. The influence of the stockholder's vote as a
check on management is eliminated.
Because of these peculiar considerations, the problem raised
by voting trusts and non-voting stock, although intimately con-
nected with the larger inquiry, is a distinct problem as a matter
of analysis. Its special treatment here is further justified by
19 See 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL PoLiCY OF CORPORATIONS (1921) xiii. In
a great many cases less than twenty per cent of the stock is sufficient to
control the corporation. See RIPLEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 95.
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the fact that it is considered a separate problem in the decisions
on voting trusts that will now be discussed.
I
Voting trusts are of four main classes:
A. Those that do not involve minority control.
B. Those which involve minority control incidentally in
accomplishing a socially desirable end.
C. Those which are used to effectuate an illegal purpose.
D. Those which squarely present the problem of minority
control.
It is submitted that the decisions can best be understood if the
distinction between voting trusts involving minority control and
all others is kept in mind.
A. VOTING TRUSTS NOT INVOLVING THE PROBLEM OF MINORITY
CONTROL
In this group of cases the voting trust is generally legal. They
must be carefully distinguished from cases which involve the
problem of minority control.
1. Corporate Reorganization. The X Manufacturing Com-
pany is organized to manufacture a commodity requiring an
extensive plant equipped with elaborate and expensive ma-
chinery. Twenty thousand shares of common stock are issued
and a million dollar bond issue is floated, secured by a first
mortgage on the plant and machinery. The company does busi-
ness for a while and is unsuccessful. It fails to pay the interest
on the outstanding bonds and the bondholders, through their
trustee or a special committee, threaten to put the corporation
into bankruptcy and wind up its affairs. This course of conduct
would be unsatisfactory for both the stockholders of the corpor-
ation and the bondholders. On execution sale the machinery and
plant would probably bring little more than a junk price and this
may not even cover the amount of indebtedness. The stock-
holders would lose all their equity. Furthermore, there is a dis-
tinct advantage in continuing the business, if possible, even at a
bare profit to avoid the delays and uncertainties of liquidation.
After a careful study of conditions the creditors decide that
the business is fundamentally sound, that more capital is needed
for further improvements and that conservative and intelligent
management would run the now failing enterprise through to
success. They are willing to lend the additional capital to the
corporation but now they want to make sure of the whole invest-
ment. They demand control.20
20 Finkelstein, op. cit. supra note 1, at 351: "The writer had occasion to
employ trust agreements in cases of this kind. Usually the difficulties in
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The stockholders agree and the immediate bankruptcy of the
corporation is averted. A majority of the stock is signed over
to trustees, usually the bankers who had marketed the bonds and
who now want to protect their clients' interests and their own
reputations. The trustees agree to hold the stock for a long
period, usually about fifteen years or until a certain amount of
the indebtedness of the corporation is cleared off. They issue
trust certificates for the shares of stock signed over to them.
These trust certificates entitle the holders thereof to be paid the
dividends derived from the stock. They are freely transferrable
and have practically all the characteristics of stock except the
voting rights, which the trustees now exercise.21
In return the creditors now lend the corporation more money,
usually through an issuance of debenture bonds. If the reorgani-
zation is successful, the corporation regains its financial health,
pays off its debentures and the trustees reassign the stock to the
holders of the trust certificates.
This is a very simple case of a voluntary reorganization, used
merely as an illustration. Reorganization cases vary greatly,
depending upon complexity of financial structure, relative
strength of various interests, and other factors which result in
widely differing voting trust agreements.
In some cases the financially interested parties control directly
because the voting trust agreement provides for annual meetings
whereby holders of securities vote in proportion to the amount
held and a majority directs the trustees to vote the stock.21
But usually the trustee is not controlled by the creditors at all,
but merely represents them in the sense that their interests are
the same or that collateral interests exist which make the trustee
desire to serve the best interests of the creditor.
23
which the corporation finds itself are due to mismanagement of the affairs
of the company or to lack of adequate working capital, or to both."
21 The holder of a voting trust certificate may not have the right to in-
spect the books of the corporation. It is also doubtful whether he can
bring a shareholder's action against the corporation. In Mcenry v. N. Y.
P. & 0. R. R., 22 Fed. 130 (N. D. Ohio, 1884), there was no adversion to
the plaintiff's capacity to bring a shareholder's action as holder of a trust
certificate when he joined his trustee as defendant, but relief was denied
on other grounds. Voting trust certificates are subject to the stock transfer
tax. TAx LAW, N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 61, § 270; U. S.
Radiator Corp. v. State, 208 N. Y. 144, 101 N. E. 783 (1913).
22 Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 So. 723 (1893).
23 Clark v. Foster, 98 Wash. 241, 167 Pac. 908 (1917). The question
arises as to the extent to which these interests in fact coincide. How far
will the banker consider the bondholder's interest in the company as he
would his own and act as a substitute for the group of scattered investors?
The extent of that identity of interest will vary in different cases and at
different times, and the best that can be done is to form some likely gen-
eralizations that will not necessarily be a description of any given case
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As a result, in a reorganization case there is not likely to be
majority rule in the form that we find it where there are 100,000
shares of common stock outstanding and control is in the hands
of the owners of a majority of those shares. Two elements
distinguish such a reorganization case from cases of normal
corporate management. First, those in control only represent a
financial interest instead of owning it as has just been pointed
out; second, the stockholders may possibly have some equity in
the failing corporation and so the trust agreement may result in
some slight disproportionate exercise of power by the creditors.
But it is very unlikely that this disproportion is going to be
great enough in the ordinary reorganization case to raise the
problem of minority control. This problem arises out of the
supposed propensity of men to misuse power when they have
nothing to lose thereby. This would presumably result in corpo-
rate mismanagement which the courts wish to avoid. But in
these reorganization cases, those in control usually have an
enormous claim, secured only by the genuine success of the corpo-
ration. Their interests and the interests of others in the corpo-
ration tend to be the same. In a corporation that has foundered,
all palties are in the same boat until definite rehabilitation has
been accomplished. It is usually certain that no dividends on
stock can be paid, and whether or not interest can be paid on the
bonds continues to remain uncertain for some time. While this
state of affairs exists, - both bondholders and stockholders are
but will have some value as a probability. As a general rule the investment
bankers who have purchased and marketed the bonds are made voting trus-
tees. There is no doubt that before the bonds are sold to the public there
is no minority control. There may be cases where large amounts of bonds
are unmarketable and remain in the hands of the underwriting syndicate
for a long period. But in most cases the bonds would quieliy leave the
hands of those in control and the question of fact as to whether the banker
is going to act in the interest of his customers is raised. Daggett approves
of voting trusts as used in railroad reorganizations, and in reference to the
problem of representation of security holders he says that the voting trus-
tees of the Baltimore and Ohio "seemed very ready to accord to new buyers
that representation and influence to which their stock might give them
claim." DAGGETT, RAILRoAD REORGANIZATION (1908) 31. This indicates that
voting trustees consider themselves real trustees since they accord privi-
leges to stockholders which they could have taken to themselves or given
to the bondholders. Cushing says that the bankers' "possible profits in
controlling future underwriting is negligible as compared with the effect
on their business of having incompletely managed a futile reorganization."
CUSHING, op. cit. s pra note 1, at 33.
The consideration that investment bankers cherish their market and will
try to back up their securities in case of threatened loss seems to justify
the conclusion that in most cases the trustee represents the bondholders'
interest in the corporation.
24The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company was reorganized in 1921 and
made an unusually rapid recovery, due to a very favorable change in the
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likely to be interested in one thing-making the enterprise income
producing immediately. There is not likely to be any question
as to whether capital surpluses are to be piled up or paid out in
dividends; or whether earnings are to be funded or not. When
the equity above the bonds is thin, conflicts of interest, which
arise out of the difference in nature of stock and bond invest-
ments, are minimized.
Moreover in the usual reorganization case, as observation of
some of the amounts involved will disclose,25 the equity of the
stockholders, if any, is so small that there is no substantial
separation of control from beneficial interest. The courts have
little difficulty in upholding the voting trusts used in such cases.
20
2. Capital Raising. Likewise, voting trusts are legal if used
to raise capital 'for a corporation in sound financial condition
when the lenders will not take the risk without more control.
Here again the question of whether the trustees will mismanage
the company because of a lack of financial interest in it is not
raised.
Simmons v. Atlanta T. & T. Co. 2 T is a memorandum opinion
wherein it is stated that a voting trust determinable on the pay-
ment of a debt is valid. The case is expressly distinguishled from
Morel v. Hoge,28 where the Georgia court condemned a voting
rubber market. Yet the common stock has earned no dividend up to date
(April, 1927) although it has greatly appreciated in market value due to
the improved condition of the company and the probability that dividends
will soon be paid.
25 In Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Nicholas, supra note 22, the total indebtedness
was $15,650,000, which far exceeded the assets, the precise amount of
which was not stated in the report. The capital stock was 53,206 shares
which, assuming the par value to be one hundred dollars and assuming
that the stockholders paid par value, would make the capital investment
$5,320,000, which is only one third of the total indebtedness. Even if it is
assumed that the stockholders had once invested five million dollars, their
investment is probably worth little or nothing at the time of the reorgan-
ization.
The sum owed by the corporation to the group given control is usually
very large. In Clark v. Foster, supra note 23, the creditors had invested
$600,000 in bonds and had bought some preferred stock, the total capitaliza-
tion being $3,000,000. In Ecker v. Kentucky Ref. Co., 144 Ky. 264, 138
S. W. 264 (1911), the liabilities were $195,000 over the assets, and the
creditors contributed part of the $100,000 additional capital that was put
into the company.
2
6 Ecker v. Kentucky Ref. Co., supra note 25; Mobile & Ohio R. R. v.
Nicholas, supra note 22; Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Ellis Granite Co., 86 Vt.
282, 84 Atl. 1017 (1912) ; Clark v. Foster, supra note 23.
Voting trust cases cannot be classified by distinguishing between an at-
tack by the cestuis and an attack by a minority stockholder. It makes no
difference who sues. See Smith, op. cit. supra note 1, at 637, n. 16.
27 139 Ga. 488, 77 S. E. 377 (1913).
28 130 Ga. 625, 61 S. E. 487 (1908).
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trust involving minority control. In MackhLt v. Nicollet Hotel -a
the plaintiff, a holder of voting trust certificates, sought to en-
join the voting trustees from voting the stock of a Delaware cor-
poration doing business in Minnesota. The common stock had
been put into a voting trust formed by the bank which had
financed the enterprise. The court sustained the voting trust.
All these voting trusts are valid, not because of their seem-
ingly good purpose or object, but because they do not involve
minority control. As the court said in Shclcmerdine v. Welshi
a very early case in the Pennsylvania inferior court:
"It matters not that the end [of the voting trust] is benefi-
cial and the motive good, because it is not always possible to
ascertain objects and motives, and if such a severance were
permissible it might be abused....'"
The court held valid the voting trust involved in the case,
which was one formed for the benefit of the creditors of the
corporation, and said:
"They [the stockholders] are not the only persons beneficially
interested in the railroad; the lien creditors are also owners,
and, if harmony is not preserved, may possess the whole.... To
decide that the election must be held exclusively on behalf of the
owners of stock certificates would frustrate rather than give
effect to the principle that votes should be cast by those who
have substantial interest in the result." "'
S. Other Voting Trusts. The use of the voting trust as a
mere proxy to carry out some definite plan does not raise the
problem of minority control. In Bowditc7 v. JcksonCo.,'2 a vot-
ing trust for one year was formed to wind up the affairs of the
company. The court found that a majority of the stock was in
fact directly voted but declared in a dictum that a voting trust
such as was involved in the case would be valid.
The voting trust can be used as a method of apportioning con-
trol among various groups so as to represent the interests of
those groups in the corporation. The readjustment of the Inter-
borough Rapid Transit Company in 1922 furnishes an excellent
example of this application of the voting trust. The committees
agreed on five voting trustees to whom the common stockholders
of the Interborough transferred their stock in exchange for
29 10 F. (2d) 375 (D. M1inn. 1926).
30 20 Phila. 199, 201, 202 (Pa. 1890).
31 The raising of capital or reorganization must be the immediate pur-
pose and cause of the voting trust. Mlere statement of a purpose to raise
capital in the future will not validate a voting trust otherwise invalid bh-
cause it effects minority control at the time. Harvey v. Linville Imp. Co.,
118 N. C. 693, 24 S. E. 489 (1896) ; Kreissl v. Distilling Co., 61 N. J. Eq.
5, 47 Atl. 471 (1900).
3276 N. H. 351, 82 Atl. 1014 (1912).
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voting trust certificates. The trust was to last for five years.
The voting trustees were to elect the eighteen directors of the
company but they were pledged to elect nine directors chosen by
the voting trust certificate holders and preferred stockholders
of the Interborough, three directors selected by bondholders of
the Interborough, three directors selected by the New York City
authorities, 33 and three directors selected by the Manhattan Rail-
way Company.
The Manhattan Railway Company had leased all its property
to the Interborough for 999 years. This lease guaranteed to the
Manhattan Company as rent, payment of all taxes on its prop-
erty, interest on its outstanding bonds and certain dividends on
its stock. The Interborough in effect owns the property of the
Manhattan and the interest of the Manhattan stockholder in the
Interborough is real and substantial.
Thus the voting trust in this case furthers instead of restricts
majority control. It provides a means whereby financial inter-
ests traditionally not considered, as having any right to partici-
pate in management are given some control.3 4
The voting trusts in all the cases thus far discussed do not
in effect separate voting power from beneficial ownership of
the corporation and they are, and should be, valid.
B. VOTING TRUSTS INVOLVING MINORITY CONTROL INCIDENTAL TO
EFFECTING A SOCIALLY DESIRABLE END.
In this group of cases voting trusts result in minority control
3 The city has refused to take part in the plan but the trustees, in filling
the city's quota, have elected directors who would represent outside in-
terests.
34 Voting trusts should be carefully distinguished from ordinary trusts
of stock which of course incidently give the trustee the right to vote the
stock. The purpose of such trusts is not to separate voting rights from
beneficial ownership. Hall v. Merrill Trust Co., 106 Me. 465, 76 Atl. 926
(1910), is an interesting case involving this distinction. The plaintiff
owned 390 shares and the Ames interest owned 892 shares of the stock of
a lumber company. Their holdings together constituted a majority of the
outstanding stock of the corporation. In order to prevent a rival lumber
company, which was trying to get control, from buying either party's
interests without buying both parties' interests, the plaintiff and Ames
made over their shares to the defendant Trust Company. The Trust Com-
pany was to vote the stock as directed by a majority of a committee made
up of the plaintiff, Ames and Wing (a disinterested third party). It was
to sell the stock if a majority of the committee so directed. The plaintiff,
acting secretly, bought out the rival company's interest and sought to get
his stock back from the defendant Trust Company. Ames and Wing or-
dered the Trust Company to sell the stock pursuant to the agreement. The
plaintiff's suit to enjoin the sale was denied, the court deciding that the
agreement was not a voting trust, but a trust to sell the stock. See Venner
v. Chicago City Ry., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N. E. 949 (1915) (a collateral trust);
Robertson v. First Nat'l Bank, 35 Idaho 363, 206 Pac. 689 (1922) (similar
to the Hall case, supra).
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and thus raise the possibility that the corporation vill be mis-
managed, but the object of the voting trust in the particular
case is so socially desirable that the courts will accept the minor-
ity control involved as a necessary evil, and will uphold the vot-
ing trust in the particular case even if, as general rule, they
may consider the voting trust unlawful. Moreover, these voting
trusts are usually limited to a short time, which fact serves to
minimize any undesirable aspect they may have for courts
condemning minority control.
In Clowes v. Miller,35 the voting trust was used to facilitate
a sale of stock and the New Jersey court allowed the control to
be separated from ownership while the sale was going on de-
spite the court's definite antagonism toward voting trusts ac-
complishing minority control. In this case the plaintiff entered
into an agreement with one Randolph whereby 2750 of the 4000
shares of the common stock of a certain corporation were trans-
ferred to the defendant trust company in trust to be voted at
Randolph's direction for two years. In case the preferred stock
of the company, to which Randolph had subscribed, was success-
fully marketed during that time, all the deposited common stock
was to go to the plaintiff. In case Randolph did not succeed in
selling the preferred stock, then 1875 shares of the deposited
common stock were to go to the plaintiff and the remaining 875
shares were to go to Randolph. Randolph sold his interest to the
defendant, Miller, who claimed Randolph's right to direct the
trustee in voting the stock. The plaintiff sought to have the
defendant, Miller, restrained from directing the trustee to vote
the stock and to have the trustee enjoined to vote the stock as
he, the plaintiff, directed.
The court held that the voting trust was valid because its
formation had been primarily in pursuance of a sale of stock
(the preferred) by the plaintiff to Randolph, but that Randolph's
fight to direct the trustee in voting the stock was a personal
right and could not be transferred to Miller. Therefore neither
Miller nor the plaintiff had the right to direct the defendant
trustee to vote the stock, and the plaintiff's plea for the man-
datory injunction was denied.
In Frost v. Carse,30 decided in 1919 by the Court of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey, a voting trust formed to prevent
the stock of a corporation manufacturing submarines for the
use of England during the war from falling into the hands of
German agents was declared valid. The only object of the Ger-
man agents in buying a controlling interest would be to interfere
with the production of the corporation. This jeopardized the in-
35 60 N. J. Eq. 179, 47 AtL. 345 (1900).
36 91 N. J. Eq. 124, 108 Atl. 642 (1919).
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terests of all the stockholders. The court upheld the voting
trust, but even in this case six judges out of the thirteen who
constituted the court dissented.
37
There is some language in the decision of the Appellate Divi-
sion of New York in the recent case of Tompers v. Bankc of
America 3 18 which indicates that a court might uphold a voting
trust which is designed to prevent a rival group from getting
control of the corporation. The main issue in the case was the
validity of a voting trust in the special case of a bank and it
involved the interpretation of the New York voting trust stat-
ute, but the court entered into some discussion of the problem
at hand. This part of the opinion is not clear and it is uncertain
whether the court was referring to a policy which would assist
in preventing the corporation from falling into the hands of
people whose interest it would be to wreck it, or whether it was
justifying the voting trust because it tended to prevent the
elimination of competition between rival groups.
It would seem that the assistance of the voting trust in enforc-
ing the law against restraint of trade would be so meagre that
courts which condemn voting trusts because they effectuate
minority control should consistently condemn even those which
tend to prevent the elimination of competition.
C. VOTING TRUSTS USED TO ACCOMPLISH AN ILLEGAL OBJECT
Thus far we have discussed voting trusts which are clearly
valid either because they do not raise the problem of minority
control at all or because they serve an end so useful in a par-
ticular situation as to outweigh the social policy (if any) which
might tend to condemn them. Now we plan to discuss voting
trusts which are clearly bad, not because there is minority con-
trol involved, but for other much more definite reasons based on
well established principles of law.
3 A court otherwise antagonistic to voting trusts resulting in minority
control will not be persuaded to uphold a voting trust designed merely to
prevent stock from falling into the hands of a person characterized as a
corporation wrecker in the voting trust agreement. There must be a real
probability that the corporation will be ruined by those seeking to buy up
control. See Bridgers v. First Nat'l Bank, 152 N. C. 293, 67 S. E. 170
(1910).
38 217 App. Div. 691, 217 N. Y. Supp. 67 (1st Dept. 1926). Judge Pros-
kauer had enjoined the voting trustees from voting the stock at the suit
of minority stockholders and voting trust certificate holders. The trustees
appealed. The Appellate Division said in part: "As the object of these
actions and the effect of the injunctions may be to open the way to a com-
peting institution to engulf the defendant bank and its management, or to
permit several speculators to embarrass the bank in the accomplishment of
their designs, the orders should have at least awaited a trial." Supra at
694, 217 N. Y. Supp. at 71. This decision will be further discussed when
the New York statute is considered infra note 61.
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In this group of cases the use of the voting trust is incidental.
If it is a crime to kill a man, then it is also a crime to kill him
with a pistol. There is no adjudication on the legality of a pistol
involved in such a case, as there would be in a case arising out of
an indictment for the violation of the Sullivan law. It is patent
that such cases should not be confused with cases where the
legality of minority control is involved and where there is a
totally distinct problem before the court. Yet the case most
cited for the proposition that voting trusts are illegal is the
Shepaug Voting Trus)t Cases,39 which is only an adjudication on
a fraudulent transaction.
One Chapman and others bought a majority of the stock of
the Shepaug Railroad and put it in trust to be voted at the di-
rection of a committee, composed of himself and others. Chap-
man and other committeemen were interested in a certain con-
struction company and the object of the purchase of the rail-
road stock and its control as above stated was to cause the rail-
road to build extensions that would result in advantageous con-
tracts with their firm. The suit arose on the occasion of a
demand by a holder of a large number of trust certificates to
have the agreement declared void and his stock returned. The
court so decreed on the ground that there was involved actual
fraud of the kind of which equity courts have always taken
notice and that the purpose of the agreement was therefore ille-
gal.40 The court's statement that the voting trust was invalid
because it involved a separation of control from beneficial in-
terest in the corporation was in no way called for by the facts
of the case.
D. VOTING TRUSTS EFFECTUATING MINORITY CONTROL
Having cleared the field, we now come to a consideration of
the legality of voting trusts used to effectuate minority control;
or in other words, the attitude of the courts on the social policy
involved in the separation of control from the beneficial owner-
ship of stock, accomplished by the device of the voting trust.
Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry.,41 decided by the Supreme
Court of California in 1897, is one of the earliest cases on the
subject and is often cited for the proposition that voting trusts
are valid. The plaintiff in this case entered into an arrangement
with two others whereby they all bought a block of stock and
made a written contract that the vote of the whole block was to
be cast as the majority of them decided for a period of five years.
They agreed to retain the voting power if they sold the stock.
39 60 Conn. 553, 24 Atl. 32 (1890).
m See State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N. E. 279 (1892).
41115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897).
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The plaintiff repudiated the agreement and demanded the right
to vote the stock at a corporate election, but his vote was re-
fused because of the contract. The plaintiff sought to set aside
the election and to compel the corporation to accept his separate
vote.
The court upheld the agreement and denied the plaintiff re-
lief. It said that the purpose of the agreement was legal-to
vote the stock in the best interest of the corporation. By that
it meant that there was no immediate illegal object as in the
Shepaug case, to which it referred in the opinion. The court
pointed out that there were no third parties involved in the
transaction.
An important point to notice in this case is the fact that the
parties made up the agreement and then went in and bought the
stock, relying on the arrangement to vote the stock as a unit.
This involves two important considerations: first, a change of
position by the parties after the agreement; second, a situation
that looks like a partnership. The court keeps talking about the
fact that there was consideration for the contract and it was
not thinking about the body of law which makes promises ab-
solutely unenforcible unless they motivate one another. It was
thinking about the added element of change of position.
This is wholly unlike the typical voting trust agreement where
the parties already own stock and then go into the agreement
for the purpose of concentrating control, but with no substantial
change of position.
Moreover, the three parties went into the common project of
purchasing stock and the vote pooling can be considered inciden-
tal to that. The fact that the shares were issued to them as
individuals should not alter the essential character of the enter-
prise, which looks very much like that of a partnership.
When we analyze the case in this manner we come very close
to the situation in Hey v. Dolphin,42 decided by the New York
Supreme Court in 1895. The plaintiff and the defendant having
launched a corporation, took out a joint certificate for 2000
shares of common stock, agreeing between themselves to own
it as tenants in common and agreeing with the corporation and
with each other that neither would sell his share without the
consent of the other. The plaintiff gave the defendant a power
of attorney to vote the stock for ten years. The plaintiff sued
to have an individual certificate issued to him and to prevent
the defendant from voting his share of the stock. The court
refused to comply with the plaintiff's demands. They said that
the transaction was clean and fair, made the point that there
4292 Hun 230, 36 N. Y. Supp. 627 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
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was consideration and finally said that it was a partnership
agreement.
The New York case differs from the Smith case in that there
is an express agreement in the former that neither party will
sell without the consent of the other. In the Smith case the
power of sale without voting power is expressly reserved. This
might have resulted in the stock getting into the hands of parties
other than those in the agreement, without voting power. But
the holding in the Smith case is essentially very weak at best, for
the reasons stated.
Brightmct v. Bates, 3 decided by the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts in 1900, with an opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes,
is often cited as upholding the voting trust. The plaintiff sued
on a covenant whereby he was to get certain commissions from
the defendant if certain stock was subscribed for and purchased
from the defendant. The subscribers subsequently agreed among
themselves to have the stock issued to a trustee, to be voted as
directed by a committee of five representing the subscribers for
th-ee years.
The defendant claimed that this dealing with the stock was
illegal and voided the agreement with the plaintiff. The court
allowed the plaintiff to recover on the ground that the agree-
ment on which the plaintiff sued was probably not sufficiently
closely connected with the voting trust agreement to be invali-
dated, even if the voting trust was void. Then the court went on
to say that the voting trust was legal.
Aside from the fact that any adjudication on the voting trust
was the weakest kind of dictum, the court itself having placed
the decision expressly on the first ground, here, again, the prob-
lem of the regular voting trust was not presented to the court
by the facts of the case.
No one with a legitimate interest in the corporation is com-
plaining. A man was trying to break, after complete execution
by the other party, what appeared to be the most harmless sort
of a contract. The stock had not yet passed out of the hands of
the owners so as to create a class of people without any rights
whatsoever, not even the meagre one of voting for the committee.
The voting trust was to last but for a short time-three years-
whereas the typical voting trust designed to effect minority
control lasts for ten or twenty years or more. The facts of the
case do not even support the dictum."'
43 175 Mass. 105, 55 N. E. 809 (1900).
-However, a recent Massachusetts case assumes the legality of a voting
trust on the authority of the Bates case. Bullivant v. First NatVI Bank,
246 Mlass. 324, 141 N. E. 41 (1923). But the facts of the case take it out
of the minority control group since the voting trust was formed because
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In Boy'er v. Nesbitt,4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
probably upheld the voting trust even when it is used to effect
minority control.4 6 Here the stock was transferred to trustees
for the general purpose, according to the agreement, of securing
efficient management of the corporation. The plaintiff was a
purchaser of a certificate of trust. The court generally ques-
tioned the wisdom of a policy which would condemn voting
trusts but concluded that, in the case before it, the provision in
the agreement whereby the trustees were to have the right to
buy the stock from anyone wishing to withdraw was "the turning
point of the case." The court said that the trust was therefore
coupled with an interest, the option to buy, and they denied the
plaintiff the right to vote the stock represented by the certificate.
It seems, however, that the talk about the option was really a
make-weight argument. An option to buy the stock at ten times
its market value could be written into every voting trust agree-
ment. It seems that the Pennsylvania courts have passed on
the question of voting trusts and have decided in their favor on
the merits, unless future courts reverse the Boyer case as a pro-
test against the reasoning in the opinion.47
In the same .year, 1910, the Virginia court decided in favor
of the voting trust when it was fairly faced with the problem
of minority control by the facts of the case of Carnegie TrWs
Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co. 48 The plaintiffs, holding stock and
trust certificates together constituting a majority in interest in
the corporation, filed a bill in equity to have the voting trust de-
clared void. The voting trust had been formed when the corpor-
ation was first organized and it was to last for twenty-five years.
The lower court had dismissed the plaintiffs' bill. The appellate
court affirmed this decision saying, in part:
"Under the recent and advanced decisions it may be asserted
as the prevailing doctrine that a pooling' trust created by a de-
posit of stock certificates for a specified period of time with the
authority to vote the same for the benefit of the owners and to
the best interests of the corporation.., is legal."'9
of the embarrassed financial condition of the corporation and the voting
trustee was a large creditor.
45 227 Pa. 398, 76 Atl. 103 (1910). This seems to overrule the dictum in
the case of Shelmerdine v. Welsh, supra note 30.
46 The term "voting trust" is used here and hereafter to designate the
type of voting trust used to effectuate minority control, unless the contrary
is indicated.
47 See Foll's Appeal, 91 Pa. 434 (1879), decided just after the panic of
that year. The Pennsylvania court there refused to grant specific perform-
ance of a contract of sale of bank stock to give control of the bank, ques-
tioning the social value of control of such institutions by individuals and
small groups.
48 111 Va. 1, 68 S. E. 412 (1910).
4
9 $upra note 48, at 21, 68 S. E. at 418 (1910).
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On the other hand the New Jersey courts, after some hesita-
tion, have finally condemned the voting trust. The last direct
decision, in Warren v. Pim, 0 resulted in a vote of seven to six
on the issue of the illegality of the voting trust involved in the
case. The plaintiff, as owner of both stock and voting trust
certificates, sued to enjoin the voting trustees from voting the
stock and to compel them to transfer the stock certificates to
him. The voting trust was to last for fifty years or until three
quarters of the certificate holders elected to terminate it. The
court granted the plaintiff's bill.5 '
Judging from the very old decision of Moses v,. Scott, - in 1888,
Alabama seems to be against the -oting trust, while Georgia
has definitely condemned it in the case of Morel v. Hogc, as
have North Carolina,54 and tMichiganP
Luthy v. Ream - definitely decided the fate of the voting trust
in Illinois in 1915. The plaintiff in that case owned a few shares
represented by voting trust certificates and also a block of minor-
ity stock not included in the voting trust. The court decided that
the voting trust transgressed both types of interests.
The Illinois courts have been particularly averse to the mod-
ern practice of separating voting power from the beneficial
ownership of stock. Even Ripley could not desire more thor-
oughgoing condemnation. In People v,. EmZersooiZ,5 they went
so far as to say that preferred stock without the right to vote
could not be issued by an incipient corporation. The court held
that all stock must be given the right to vote under the statute
and the' constitutional provision which read as follows: -5
".... . Every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person
or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him,
for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be
elected, or to cumulate such shares and give one candidate as
many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number
of shares of stock shall equal .. ." ;
zo 66 N. J. Eq. 353, 59 At. 773 (1904).
51 Canda v. Canda, 113 Atl. 503 (N. 3. 1920), contains a dictum that a
voting trust is illegal. Cf. Frost v. Carse, supra note 36. There is also
a dictum by the Court of Chancery that voting trusts are invalid in White
v. Thomas Tire Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 178, 28 Atl. 75 (1893). But see legislation
infTa note 60.
52 84 Ala. 608, 4 So. 742 (1888).
53 Supra note 28.
54 Sheppard v. Rockingham Power Co., 150 N. C. 770, 64 S. E. 894 (1909).
55 Billings v. Marshall Furnace Co., 210 Mich. 1, 177 N. W. 222 (1920).
56 270 I 170, 110 N. E. 373 (1915).
57 802 Ill. 300, 134 N. E. 707 (1922).
Z; ILL. CONST., Art. xI, § 3 (1870).
59 This is an ordinary cumulative voting provision. A similar enact-
ment in Missouri was construed by the Supreme Court of that state to
apply only to common stock (possibly also to all stock already accorded
voting privileges). State v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89 S. W. 872 (1905).
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As far as decisions are concerned, the law of voting trusts can
hardly be said to be thoroughly formed. The courts have not
taken a definite stand on the matter one way or the other in more
than six or seven jurisdictions. What little law there is is de-
finitely in the direction of illegality.
Eight states including New York and Delaware have passed
statutes legalizing voting trusts for a stated period10 These
statutes are far from settling the law. As yet there are no im-
portant adjudications under them to fix their meaning. They
could well be restricted by hostile courts to apply only to re-
organization, creditor, special counter-balancing advantages, etc.,
situations, and be held to be merely declaratory of the common
law on these subjects.6 ' They may even have the effect of cutting
60 N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 60, § 50: "A stockholder, by
agreement in writing, may transfer his stock to a voting trustee or trus-
tees for the purpose of conferring the right to vote thereon for a period
not exceeding ten years upon the terms and conditions therein stated. Every
other stockholder may transfer his stock to the same trustee or trustees
and thereupon shall be a party to such agreement. The certificates of stock
so transferred shall be surrendered and canceled and new certificates there.
for issued to such trustee or trustees. . ." Ark. Cons. Laws Ann. (Castle,
1927) § 17ooi (five years); Del. Laws (1925) c. 112, § 6 (ten years); Fla.
Cum. Stat. (1925) § 4120 (19) (ten years); Md. Code (Bagby, 1924) art.
23, § 133 (five years); Nev. Stat. (1925) c. 177, § 22 (five years); N. J.
Acts 1926, c. 318, § 5 (ten years); Ohio Gen. Corp. Act (1927) § 34.
Voting trusts are permitted in California in the case of agricultural and
other cooperative associations. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1923) § 321c.
61 There is a dictum to the effect that certain voting trusts will be held
invalid despite the statute in Knickerbocker Inv. Co. v. Vorhees, 100 App.
Div. 414, 91 N. Y. Supp. 816 (1st Dept. 1905). The excellent opinion of
Judge Proskauer in the special term hearing of the case of Tempers v.
Bank of America, supra note 38 (Nat'l Liberty Ins. Co. v. Bank of America,
126 Misc. 753, 214 N. Y. Supp. 643 (Sup. Ct. 1926) ) shows the unsettled
state of the law under the statute. Judge Proskauer held that the statute
did not change the law, at least in some respects. In that case a majority
of the stock Qf a bank was transferred to voting trustees, some of whom, it
was alleged, were officers of the bank. The trust was to last for ten years.
Certificates were issued to the cestuis. There was provision made in the
agreement for filing, etc., to comply with the New York voting trust statute
(supra note 60). The plaintiffs held minority stock and voting trust
certificates and they sued to enjoin the voting trustees from voting the stock
represented by their trust certificates. The principal question in the case
was whether the agreement was entered into before March 12, 1925, when
an amendment to § 50 was adopted which expressly excluded banks from its
provisions. Judge Proskauer's decree granting an injunction pendento lito
was reversed by the Appellate Division, which disagreed with his applica-
tion of the amendment to the facts of the case and also disagreed with his
outlook on the general law of voting trusts. The court's treatment of the
common law was incidental and it leaves the legal status of voting trusts
very uncertain. See supra note 38. The whole opinion may be taken as a
denial of the injunction pendente lite only, and as not passing on the merits
at all.
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down the common law right to form a voting trust for purposes
other than minority control to the statutory period c
2
ii.
Class A, non-voting stock, raises in a different manner the
same problem of the social policy of minority control. But, in
contrast to the voting trust situation, the present law is quite
clear that non-voting stock can be legally issued except in fli-
nois where, in the absence of other provision in the statutes, the
cumulative voting provision resulted in an adjudication that no
stock can be issued without voting power.
While there are to the writer's knowledge no decisions on the
subject, practically all the statutes by implication permit the
deprivation of stock of voting power on issuance. Some stat-
utes, like New York's, expressly allow corporations to limit vot-
ing power as they please in this regard. There is always the
possibility of these statutes being construed to apply only to
stock with a fixed income (preferred) but this is unlikely. Any
change in the legal status of non-voting stock would have to come
as a result of legislative enactment.
As a device for securing minority control, the voting trust
would seem less objectionable than non-voting stock. The voting
taust must start with majority control. The stockholder is
given the power and then freely alienates it, having made a free
decision that the voting trust is for his best interest.
This fact is not as important as it may appear, however, be-
cause, if there is water in the capital structure of the corporation,
as there often is, the holders of the stock issued for the inflated
valuation form the voting trust and then sell the trust certifi-
cates to the real investor.
More substantial is the argument that, in the voting trust,
responsibility is fixed in a small definite group, likely to be known
by all the other stockholders and by anyone interested in the
corporation.63 There is less likelihood of misconduct in this sit-
uation than there is when the same control is exercised by in-
dividuals as stockholders. The psychology of the situation is
different.
Outside of these differences in the manner in which the de-
vices work, there is no other distinction between them in the
problem involved, which is that of the social policy of allowing
or disallowing, as far as possible, minority control of corporate
enterprise.
Whenever the courts pass on this problem they really decide
62 See Note (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 951.
63 "The advantages to all concerned of a responsible management which
is publicly held accountable for its trust are too obvious to require com-
ment." S DEwwNG, op. cit. supra note 19, at 152.
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the broadest kind of a sociologic question :-Is it probable
enough that the absence of proportionate financial interest will
result in fraud or misconduct in the management of our huge
corporate enterprises so that we should treat the matter as if it
were directly intended and prevent the separation of power from
ownership at the outset?
The courts do not hesitate to answer the question in the affirm-
ative when a stockholder's vote is purchased either with cash or
by handing him an office in the corporation or by giving him a
contract right in exchange. The common law, as well as modern
statute law, forbids the purchase and sale of the right to vote
stock. We are generally committed to the proposition that this
would be a harmful practice because of the high probability that
such transactions will result in fraudulent and ineffectual corpor-
ate management.
But on the question of control, unpurchased and not entirely
separate from a legitimate interest in the corporation such as
the voting trust or non-voting stock involve, it is much more
difficult to pass. The method of attacking such a problem is
thorough-going research into the facts of corporate orgaifization,
corporate control and corporate activity. It would involve the
collection and study of data on the proportion of unsuccessful
corporations which fail because of inefficient or corrupt manage-
ment, the social effects of such failure, and the effect of the
elimination of such failures, where possible, on the economic
structure of society. It would involve an inquiry as to what
persons control what corporations and an understanding of their
financial and social standings (to determine the question of
whether it would be to their ultimate interests to mismanage
the corporations they control). In short, it would require the
same kind of approach that the successful solution of any social
problem demands-an intensive study of the phenomena and
tabulation and correlation of the resulting data.
The factors that would be discovered to set over against the
possibility of abuse would probably be: first, continuity of
management, with the advantages that flow therefrom, such as
the formation of personal connections, increasing familiarity
with the details of the business and the like; second, unvacillating,
long-time policies.
The fact previously noted, that in most corporations to-day
the stock is widely held and that consequently there is control
by the compact minority, may throw some light on the problem.
However, it must be remembered that although somewhat simi-
lar, the situation is not the same and an essentially distinct
problem is involved because the controlling group usually owns
a substantial block of stock, some of which, at least, probably
represents real investment. Also, there is always the possibility
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of overturning the management if it becomes obviously bad as
respects the interest of the majority. In some cases this check on
the controlling minority is a real force, compelling them to act
fairly. In general the force may not be very real, but it may
have the effect of continually causing the controlling minority to
seek to justify its management as a result of its imaginary
fears.6 4
Moreover, it may be said that the law has accepted this kind
of minority contr-ol as a fact and has developed along lines which
result in throwing fundamental safeguards around the interests
of those out of power. This development prevents flagrant
abuse of any kind of power in corporate management. When
actual fraud is involved or when those in control violate well
recognized property rights, the law gives relief, no matter what
arrangements the parties have made among themselves as to
the control of the corporation. The by-laws cannot be amended
so as to alter substantially the rights of stockholders; a pros-
perous corporation cannot be sold out; obviously unfair dividend
policies cannot be pursued. 5
But when the matter of management policy is alone involved,
the courts have definitely refused to interfere, and the stock-
holder's vote is his only recourse. Whether we should allow him
to purchase an ownership interest in the corporation without
such a power, or whether we should allow him to give away
that power, is a question that can be intelligently answered, not
by the aid of political theory which the courts tend to use as a
result of the history of the corporation, but by an inquiry into
the sociological and economic factors involved.
64 The writer has been informed of one instance where a corporation had
originally issued and widely marketed non-voting stock. For special rea-
sons it -was decided to give voting rights to the non-voting stockholders.
As a result, the management thought it necessary to make numerous alter-
ations in the charter at great additional inconvenience and expense in order
to safeguard themselves against the outstanding voting power that they
were about to create.
65 See Berle, op. cit. supra note 1, at 679.
